Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 126
Issue: 3
Pages: 1375-1409

Score contribution per author:

2.691 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We estimate the impact of coups and top-secret coup authorizations on asset prices of partially nationalized multinational companies that stood to benefit from U.S.-backed coups. Stock returns of highly exposed firms reacted to coup authorizations classified as top-secret. The average cumulative abnormal return to a coup authorization was 9% over 4 days for a fully nationalized company, rising to more than 13% over 16 days. Precoup authorizations accounted for a larger share of stock price increases than the actual coup events themselves. There is no effect in the case of the widely publicized, poorly executed Cuban operations, consistent with abnormal returns to coup authorizations reflecting credible private information. We also introduce two new intuitive and easy to implement nonparametric tests that do not rely on asymptotic justifications. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:3:p:1375-1409
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25