Joint search with no information: An immediate agreement theorem

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 160
Issue: C
Pages: 43-45

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The no-information case of a finite horizon joint search problem between two players with conflicting preferences is studied. It is shown that if the players have convex preferences and are patient enough, then they abandon their search by accepting the first period alternative.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:160:y:2017:i:c:p:43-45
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25