Outsourcing induced by strategic competition

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2011
Volume: 29
Issue: 4
Pages: 484-492

Authors (3)

Chen, Yutian (not in RePEc) Dubey, Pradeep (not in RePEc) Sen, Debapriya (Toronto Metropolitan Universit...)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the "outside" (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that "inside" firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:484-492
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25