On the Problem of Prevention

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2013
Volume: 54
Issue: 3
Pages: 787-805

Authors (2)

JEAN‐PIERRE BENOÎT (not in RePEc) JUAN DUBRA (Universidad de Montevideo)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Disasters are often precipitated by insufficient preventive care. We argue that there is a problem of prevention in that this lack of care often stems from agents’ rational calculations. Positive experiences lead agents to underestimate the risks of disasters; technological improvements and redundancies designed for safety induce agents to reduce their care. Although lower care increases the chances of an accident, the number of redundancies can be adjusted to offset this. However, the accident probability remains constant even as ostensible improvements in safety are made. Checklists can be used to decrease the number of accidents.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:787-805
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25