Time pressure and risk taking in auctions: A field experiment

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 78
Issue: C
Pages: 68-79

Authors (4)

Haji, Anouar El (not in RePEc) Krawczyk, Michał (Uniwersytet Warszawski) Sylwestrzak, Marta (not in RePEc) Zawojska, Ewa (Uniwersytet Warszawski)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Auctions often require risk taking under time pressure. However, little is known about how time pressure moderates the relationship between uncertainty of outcomes and bidding behavior. This study consists of a field experiment in which participants are invited to a Vickrey auction to elicit their willingness to pay for a lottery ticket. The time available to place a bid and also the payoff variance of the lottery are systematically manipulated. We find that under high time pressure participants are less likely to place a bid at all. Furthermore, participants who do place a bid under high time pressure bid significantly less than participants under low time pressure. The main finding is that increased time pressure significantly decreases risk taking. The effect seems to be particularly strong for the lottery with a high probability of winning and for female subjects.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:78:y:2019:i:c:p:68-79
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25