Screening of possibly incompetent agents

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 135
Issue: C
Pages: 15-18

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Accepting a contract with a high performance sensitivity is normally interpreted as a signal of high ability. However, a high self-assessment may be an incompetent forecast by an incompetent worker. In a model where optimistic agents have low ability, a low performance sensitivity screens out the incompetent agents. However, when agents are wealthy enough, the principal prefers to select the incompetent agent who covers the downside (as in a vanity press).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:135:y:2015:i:c:p:15-18
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25