Signals, Information, and the Value of College Names

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2025
Volume: 107
Issue: 2
Pages: 355-371

Authors (2)

Alex Eble (Columbia University) Feng Hu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Colleges can send signals about their quality by adopting new, more alluring names. We study how this affects college choice and labor market performance of college graduates. Administrative data show name-changing colleges enroll higher-aptitude students, with larger effects for alluring-but-misleading name changes and among students with less information. A large resume audit study suggests a small premium for new college names in most jobs, and a significant penalty in lower-status jobs. We characterize student and employer beliefs using web-scraped text, surveys, and other data. Our study shows signals designed to change beliefs can have real, lasting impacts on market outcomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:107:y:2025:i:2:p:355-371
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25