The strategic use of download limits by a monopoly platform

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2015
Volume: 46
Issue: 2
Pages: 297-327

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main"> <p>We offer a new explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile-phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes content providers to reduce prices or improve quality. This generates greater surplus for consumers, which a platform captures via higher consumer access fees. Even accounting for congestion externalities, a platform limits downloads more than would be welfare maximizing; indeed, by so much, that barring such practices can be welfare superior to what a platform would do. Paradoxically, a platform will install more bandwidth when it can restrict downloads than when it cannot.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:46:y:2015:i:2:p:297-327
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25