In-group favoritism in natural and minimal groups

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2022
Volume: 219
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Eckel, Catherine C. (Texas A&M University) Wilson, Rick K. (not in RePEc) Youn, Sora (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine giving to an in-group member relative to an out-group member in the third party (other-other) dictator game. Individuals are randomly assigned to real groups under a “weak” and a “strong” condition, and also assigned to artificial groups using the minimal group paradigm. We compare the effect of the type of group on subject’s allocation of an amount of money between an in-group member and a person who is not a member of the in-group, using a within-subject design with repeated measures. We find that the Weak and Strong real group conditions bracket the Minimal group condition.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002890
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25