Blaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2010
Volume: 73
Issue: 1
Pages: 109-119

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Binmore and Shaked (this issue) criticize Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model of inequality aversion. We present a considerable body of experimental research supporting the inequality aversion motive. Binmore and Shaked also urge experimentalists to adopt "a more skeptical attitude when far-reaching claims about human behavior are extrapolated from very slender data." It is true that experimental findings indicate that the standard neoclassical model fails to predict a considerable range of strategic behaviors widely observed in the laboratory, particularly under conditions where normative behavior is prevalent in every-day social life. This is indeed a "far-reaching claim," but one amply justified by an impressive and constantly growing body of evidence from experiments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:1:p:109-119
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25