CEO compensation: Evidence from the field

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 150
Issue: 3

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay matters not to finance consumption but to address CEOs’ fairness concerns. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy, leading to lower levels and one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Intrinsic motivation and reputation are seen as stronger motivators than incentive pay. Even with strong portfolio incentives, flow pay responds to performance to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:150:y:2023:i:3:s0304405x23001587
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25