Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Year: 2016
Volume: 8
Issue: 2
Pages: 215-37

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper highlights a pecuniary externality that results in excessive financing costs. Firms borrow to finance purchases of an inelastically supplied input, bidding up its price. Since higher input prices necessitate more debt obligations, this leads to an increase in intermediation costs. A quantitative interpretation of the model suggests that it is optimal to tax financial intermediation by increasing the borrowing rate by 3 percentage points. (JEL E13, E44, G21, G32, H21, H25)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmac:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:215-37
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25