A characterization of exact non-atomic market games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 54
Issue: C
Pages: 59-62

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive non-atomic measures, which is of independent interest.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:59-62
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24