Asset Pricing and Asymmetric Reasoning

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2015
Volume: 123
Issue: 1
Pages: 66 - 122

Authors (4)

Elena Asparouhova (not in RePEc) Peter Bossaerts (not in RePEc) Jon Eguia (Michigan State University) William Zame (University of California-Los A...)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We present a theory and experimental evidence on pricing and portfolio choices under asymmetric reasoning. We show that under asymmetric reasoning, prices do not reflect all (types of) reasoning. Some agents who observe prices that cannot be reconciled with their reasoning switch from perceiving the environment as risky to perceiving it as ambiguous. If they are ambiguity-averse, these agents become price-insensitive. Results from an experiment show that, consistent with the theory, (i) without aggregate risk, mispricing decreases as the fraction of price-sensitive agents increases; and (ii) with aggregate risk, price-insensitive agents trade to more balanced portfolios.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/679283
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25