Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2017

Volume: 155

Issue: C

Pages: 55-58

Authors (2)

Eichler, Stefan (Technische Universität Dresden) Lähner, Tom (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We find that career experience shapes the voting behavior of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members. Members with a career in the Riksbank and the government prefer higher rates. During a legislation with a center-right (center-left) party administration, MPC members with a career background in the government favor higher (lower) interest rates.

Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee

Authors (2)

Abstract

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