Dividends, Taxes, and Signaling: Evidence from Germany.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 1997
Volume: 52
Issue: 1
Pages: 397-408

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The higher taxation of dividends in the United States gave rise to theories that explain why companies pay dividends. Tax-based signaling models propose that the higher tax on dividends is a necessary condition to make them informative about companies' values. In Germany, where dividends are not tax-disadvantaged and in fact are taxed lower for most investor classes, these models predict that dividends are not informative. However, the authors find that the stock price reaction to dividend news in Germany is similar to that found in the United States. This suggests other reasons, beyond taxation, that make dividends informative. Copyright 1997 by American Finance Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:52:y:1997:i:1:p:397-408
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24