Informational Asymmetries and Observational Learning in Search

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Year: 2005
Volume: 30
Issue: 3
Pages: 241-259

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

As economics modeling moves from super rational decision makers to considering boundedly rational agents, some economic problems deserve a second look. This paper studies the effects of learning on the efficiency of search. Once learning is taken into account, the structure of information flow becomes important. In particular, I highlight the truncated information structure in the search problem. Agents stop searching once a sufficiently attractive price is found. Therefore, they observe the performance of shorter searches, but do not directly observe the performance of longer searches. I design and conduct an experiment to test the hypothesis that this asymmetric flow of information leads agents to search too little. I find strong evidence in its favor. This suggests that in the presence of learning, the provision of a more symmetric information structure will make search more efficient. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:jrisku:v:30:y:2005:i:3:p:241-259
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25