Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2018
Volume: 126
Issue: 1
Pages: 178 - 215

Authors (4)

Liran Einav (Stanford University) Chiara Farronato (not in RePEc) Jonathan Levin (Stanford University) Neel Sundaresan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Auctions were very popular in the early days of internet commerce, but today online sellers mostly use posted prices. We model the choice between auctions and posted prices as a trade-off between competitive price discovery and convenience. Evidence from eBay fits the theory. We then show that the decline in auctions was not driven by compositional shifts in seller experience or items sold, but by changing seller incentives. We estimate the demand facing sellers and document falling sale probabilities and falling relative demand for auctions. Both favor posted prices; our estimates suggest the latter is more important for the auction decline. Survey evidence provides further support.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/695529
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25