Suspense and Surprise

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2015
Volume: 123
Issue: 1
Pages: 215 - 260

Authors (3)

Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University) Alexander Frankel (not in RePEc) Emir Kamenica (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period's beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/677350
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25