Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2001
Volume: 49
Issue: 3
Pages: 247-268

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a housing insurance market buildings have different damage probabilities. High‐risk houses need investment, low‐risk houses don’t. Insurers use imperfect tests to assess risks. The market is a natural monopoly: with more than one active insurer, high‐risk house owners continue to apply to insurers until they are eventually assigned to the low‐risk class. The natural monopoly need not be sustainable. In equilibrium the incumbent accommodates entry even when the natural monopoly is sustainable. We explain recent observations from Germany and Switzerland where damage rates and prices went up drastically after the transition from state monopolies to competitive environments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:247-268
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25