The Efficacy of Tournaments for Nonroutine Team Tasks

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 42
Issue: 4
Pages: 921 - 948

Authors (5)

Score contribution per author:

0.804 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams’ identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a nonroutine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a field experiment (n>1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social image motivates the top performers. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams’ outcomes without crowding out teams’ willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/725553
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-25