The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2024
Volume: 132
Issue: 8
Pages: 2695 - 2747

Authors (5)

Score contribution per author:

1.609 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams’ demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729443
Journal Field
General
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-25