The medical doctors as gatekeepers in the sickness insurance?

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2012
Volume: 44
Issue: 28
Pages: 3615-3625

Authors (2)

Per Engström (not in RePEc) Per Johansson (Government of Sweden)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Based on a randomized experiment, we estimate effects from notification to medical doctors of tighter monitoring of their Medical Certificates (MCs). Both the time prescribed by the doctor certificates for sick leave (prescribed sick leave) and the impact on the length of the actual sickness absence (actual sick leave) is studied. We find no effect on the total number of prescribed sick leave days. However, we do find an increase in both prescribed and actual sick leave with a 25% work inability. We also find that the notification letter causes an increase in actual sick leave (i.e. the number of reimbursed sick days). We discuss a number of potential explanations for this rather surprising result.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:44:y:2012:i:28:p:3615-3625
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25