The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed: A Vignette Study

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 5
Pages: 91-95

Authors (2)

Sandro Ambuehl (not in RePEc) Axel Ockenfels (Universität zu Köln)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Our recent working paper (Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart 2017) shows theoretically and experimentally that people with higher costs of information processing respond more to an increase in the incentive for a complex transaction, and decide to participate based on a worse understanding of its consequences. Here, we address the resulting tradeoff between the principle of informed consent and the principle of free contract. Respondents to our vignette study on oocyte donation overwhelmingly favor the former and support policies that require donors to thoroughly understand the transaction. This finding helps design markets that are not only efficient but also considered ethical.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:91-95
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24