Lobbying and Concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg Games.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2001
Volume: 109
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 175-81

Authors (2)

Epstein, Gil S (University College London (UCL...) Hefeker, Carsten (Universität Siegen)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:109:y:2001:i:1-2:p:175-81
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25