Evaluating Education Programs That Have Lotteried Admission and Selective Attrition

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 32
Issue: 1
Pages: 27 - 63

Authors (5)

John Engberg (not in RePEc) Dennis Epple (Carnegie Mellon University) Jason Imbrogno (not in RePEc) Holger Sieg (not in RePEc) Ron Zimmer (University of Kentucky)

Score contribution per author:

0.804 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the effectiveness of magnet programs in an urban district that ration excess demand by admission lotteries. Differential attrition arises since students who lose the lottery are more likely to pursue options outside the school district than students who win the lottery. When students leave the district, important outcome variables are often not observed. The treatment effects are not point-identified. We exploit known quantiles of the outcome distribution to construct informative bounds on treatment effects. We find that magnet programs improve behavioral outcomes but have no significant effect on achievement.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/671797
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-25