Bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2008
Volume: 32
Issue: 8
Pages: 1677-1686

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank. The regulator/insurer of a bank owns a down-and-in call option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost. Raising the regulatory barrier (critical asset level triggering bank closure) leads to a transfer of wealth from stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk. Empirical tests on a sample of 152 one-bank holding companies show that regulatory barriers are priced in the stock market and are inversely related to Tier 1 leverage ratios.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:8:p:1677-1686
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25