Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 5
Pages: 101-06

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose a continuous time model to investigate the impact of inflation credibility on sovereign debt dynamics. At every point in time, an impatient government decides fiscal surplus and inflation, without commitment. Inflation is costly, but reduces the real value of outstanding nominal debt. In equilibrium, debt dynamics is the result of two opposing forces: (i) impatience and (ii) the desire to conquer low inflation. A large increase in inflation credibility can trigger a process of debt accumulation. This rationalizes the sovereign debt booms that are often experienced by low inflation credibility countries upon joining a currency union.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:101-06
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24