Rules versus Discretion in Public Service: Teacher Hiring in Mexico

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 37
Issue: 2
Pages: 545 - 579

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper compares the performance of teachers hired on the basis of a standardized exam to those hired at the union’s discretion in Mexico. My results show that the discretionary hires perform considerably worse than the rule-based hires (as measured by value added to student achievement). The evidence presented here shows the impact of personnel selection mechanisms on the quality of public service delivery.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/700192
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25