An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Emergence of Property Rights

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2014
Volume: 6
Issue: 3
Pages: 203-26

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We model the emergence of an innate, biological sense of property rights where resource scarcity and output contestability reign. Preferences evolve such that, in evolutionarily stable equilibrium, an object is valued more by an individual who possesses it, or has produced it, than if he is neither possessor nor producer. In a distributional contest for the object, the possessor/producer will devote more effort to retaining it than an interloper will to expropriating it. Asymmetry in preferences for an object between possessor/producer and interloper, and consequent asymmetry of efforts defending or expropriating it, constitute our concept of innate property rights.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:203-26
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25