Platform acquisitions and Nash bargaining

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2024
Volume: 235
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A merger between a device-driven platform and a service developer engaged in bilateral negotiations with competing platforms can be welfare enhancing. The merger increases platform competition and can benefit consumers even when it increases the bargaining leverage of the service provider vis-à-vis rival platforms and generates opposing effects on the prices of devices and services on different platforms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:235:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524000181
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25