Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 12
Issue: 3
Pages: 303-320

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

During the past half century, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The “Received Theory” of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms‐of‐trade externalities between national governments, offers an explanation that has become the conventional wisdom. But it is dramatically inconsistent with actual trade agreements. This paper offers an alternative explanation, based on intergovernmental political externalities, consistent with what we actually observe. With remarkably little necessary formal structure—in particular, no formal bargaining model—this framework (chosen to parallel actual experience) gives an immediate and transparent role to the basic characteristics of contemporary trade agreements: gradual liberalization, reciprocity, nondiscrimination, and multilateralism.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:12:y:2004:i:3:p:303-320
Journal Field
International
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25