Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Year: 2010
Volume: 2
Issue: 3
Pages: 235-71

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The value of communication is analyzed in a model in which agents' expectations need not be consistent with central bank policy. Without communication, the Taylor principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability: divergent learning dynamics are possible. Three communication strategies are contemplated to ensure consistency between private forecasts and monetary policy strategy: communicating the precise details of policy; communicating only the variables on which policy decisions are conditioned; and communicating the inflation target. The former strategies restore the Taylor principle as a sufficient condition for anchoring expectations. The latter strategy, in general, fails to protect against expectations-driven fluctuations. (JEL E32, E43, E52, E58)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmac:v:2:y:2010:i:3:p:235-71
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25