On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2003
Volume: 22
Issue: 1
Pages: 227-232

Authors (2)

Rabah Amir (University of Iowa) Isabel Grilo (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:1:p:227-232
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24