The lottery contest is a best-response potential game

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 155
Issue: C
Pages: 168-171

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

It is shown that the n-player lottery contest admits a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000). This is true also when the contest technology reflects the possibility of a draw. The result implies, in particular, the existence of a non-trivial two-player zero-sum game that is best-response equivalent to a game with identical payoff functions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:168-171
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25