Ordinal potentials in smooth games

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2020
Volume: 70
Issue: 4
Pages: 1069-1100

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract In the class of smooth non-cooperative games, exact potential games and weighted potential games are known to admit a convenient characterization in terms of cross-derivatives (Monderer and Shapley in Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996a). However, no analogous characterization is known for ordinal potential games. The present paper derives necessary conditions for a smooth game to admit an ordinal potential. First, any ordinal potential game must exhibit pairwise strategic complements or substitutes at any interior equilibrium. Second, in games with more than two players, a condition is obtained on the (modified) Jacobian at any interior equilibrium. Taken together, these conditions are shown to correspond to a local analogue of the Monderer–Shapley condition for weighted potential games. We identify two classes of economic games for which our necessary conditions are also sufficient.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:70:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01257-1
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25