The Trade‐Off Between Supervision and Wages: Evidence of Efficiency Wages from the NLSY

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 1999
Volume: 66
Issue: 2
Pages: 424-432

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Standard efficiency wage models suggest that workers employed in places with lower probabilities of identifying shirking will earn more, as will workers who have better alternative opportunities. This paper provides new empirical evidence in support of efficiency wage theory using the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth data. The empirical results support the prediction of the model that workers employed in larger work groups are paid more, a finding consistent with a supervision‐wage trade‐off. Additional evidence supports the prediction that workers with better alternative opportunities earn more.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:66:y:1999:i:2:p:424-432
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25