Capital Taxation and Ownership When Markets Are Incomplete

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2010
Volume: 118
Issue: 5
Pages: 908 - 948

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper is a normative investigation of the properties of optimal capital taxation in the neoclassical growth model with aggregate shocks and incomplete markets. The model features a representative-agent economy with linear taxes on labor and capital. I first allow the government to trade only a real risk-free bond. Optimal policy has the following features: labor taxes fluctuate very little, capital taxes are volatile and feature a positive (negative) spike after a negative (positive) shock to the government budget, and capital taxes average to roughly zero across periods. I then consider the implications of allowing the government to trade capital.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/657996
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25