Variational Bewley preferences

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 157
Issue: C
Pages: 699-729

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper characterizes variational Bewley preferences over Anscombe and Aumann acts, a class of binary relations that may fail completeness or transitivity vis à vis independence. The main result gives an axiomatization of preference relations ≿ represented as follows:f≿g⇔∫u(f)dp+η(p)≥∫u(g)dp for all p∈Δ, where u is an affine utility index over a convex set X of consequences, η:Δ→[0,∞] is an ambiguity index, and Δ is the set of priors over the state space S. This representation has a natural interpretation as a weighted unanimity rule, with the function η reflecting the weight given to a prior and higher values of η corresponding to priors given less weight. Bewley's incomplete preferences can be identified precisely with the addition of transitivity or independence, and a prior receives weight either 0 if plausible or ∞ when discarded. Also, by adding only completeness, we recover subjective expected utility, i.e., the lack of transitivity implies incompleteness. Finally, we find a strong connection of our model with the class of variational preferences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:699-729
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25