BANKS, DEBT AND RISK: ASSESSING THE SPILLOVERS OF CORPORATE TAXES

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Year: 2020
Volume: 58
Issue: 2
Pages: 1023-1044

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We find evidence of tax‐driven strategic allocation of debt and asset risk across group entities of European banks. We evaluate the effects that establishing tax neutrality between debt and equity finance has on systemic risk, and show that the degree of coordination in implementing the hypothetical tax reform matters. In particular, a coordinated elimination of the tax advantage of debt would significantly reduce systemic losses in the event of a severe banking crisis. By contrast, uncoordinated tax reforms are not equally beneficial precisely because national tax policies generate spillovers through cross‐border bank activities. (JEL G21, G28, H25)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:2:p:1023-1044
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25