Step thinking and costly coordination

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 120
Issue: 2
Pages: 181-183

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using the experimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005), we show that step thinking fits the long-run outcome of minimum-effort and median-effort games surprisingly well for all values of the cost parameter. In the latter, the predicted discontinuous behaviour of step thinking accommodates the bimodal pattern observed for the intermediate values of the cost parameter quite well.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:181-183
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25