Optimal policy with dispersed information and uncertain monetary transmission

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2023
Volume: 229
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a setting with dispersed information, monopolistic competition and sticky-prices, a policy authority uncertain about the monetary transmission mechanism reacts prudently to supply shocks. This induces producers to ascribe an excessive importance to their private information when setting prices. To correct the ensuing inefficiency a state-contingent fiscal policy is required.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:229:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300229x
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25