Choosing a partner for social exchange: Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2016
Volume: 129
Issue: C
Pages: 157-171

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

People benefit from being perceived as trustworthy. Examples include sellers trying to attract buyers, or candidates in elections trying to attract voters. In a laboratory experiment using exchange games, in which the trustor can choose the trustee, we study whether trustees can signal their trustworthiness by giving to charity. Our results show that donors are indeed perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners. As a consequence of this sorting pattern, relative payoffs to donors and non-donors differ substantially with and without partner choice. However, we do not find donors to be significantly more trustworthy than non-donors. Our findings suggest that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility or donations to charity during a political campaign, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:129:y:2016:i:c:p:157-171
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25