Transparency and special interests

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 106
Issue: 1
Pages: 4-7

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper opposing lobbies influence a politician via contributions. Society may grant access to decision relevant information. Transparency maximizes welfare if the lobbies have a similar size. Secrecy is optimal if their size is comparable, but not too similar.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:1:p:4-7
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25