The Safety Regulation of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Violations, Inspections, and Abnormal Occurrences.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1989
Volume: 97
Issue: 1
Pages: 115-54

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Data from more than one-thousand inspections by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission form the basis for an investigation into the nature of safety regulation at U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. Poisson (and binary choice) models of the rate of occurrence of violations during each inspection period are specified, and are extended to control for nondetection and for the possibility that violations persist from one inspection to the next. These models are used to study the factors associated with noncompliance, relative rankings of plants according to propensity to violate, the variation in detection rates among Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors, and the relationship between undetected violations and abnormal occurrences. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:1:p:115-54
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25