From me to we: Beating procrastination in teams

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2025
Volume: 231
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Chakraborty, Anujit (not in RePEc) Fenig, Guidon (Université d'Ottawa)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Can team incentives increase workers’ productivity and decrease procrastination in intertemporal tasks? We recruited 597 online workers to engage in tedious tasks over three days. They were randomly assigned to either individualistic (Solo) incentives or to one of two team-based incentives (Cooperative and Competitive). Contrary to theoretical predictions, workers under Cooperative incentives surpassed the performance of those working under either Solo or Competitive incentives. Productivity on Day 1, which in theory should inversely relate to procrastination, was also significantly higher in both team treatments. Our structural analysis confirms that teams increase productivity by enhancing intrinsic motivation and by reducing the tendency to delay work. Finally, teams increase productivity further under Competitive incentives, when workers can observe and react to the efforts of their team members.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:231:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000204
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25