On the acceptance of apologies

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 82
Issue: C
Pages: 592-608

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses an apology strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:592-608
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25