Teacher Performance-Based Incentives and Learning Inequality

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Human Resources
Year: 2025
Volume: 60
Issue: 3

Authors (3)

Deon Filmer (World Bank Group) James Habyarimana (not in RePEc) Shwetlena Sabarwal (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study evaluates the impacts of low-cost, performance-based incentives in Tanzanian secondary schools. Results from a two-phase randomized trial show that teacher incentives, when sustained for two years, led to persistent, modest average improvements in student achievement across different subjects. Randomly withdrawing incentives after a year did not lead to a “discouragement effect.” Incentives may have exacerbated learning inequality across schools. Increases in learning were concentrated among initially better-performing schools. We also find weak evidence of teacher incentives exacerbating learning inequality within initially better-performing schools. Finally, the study finds that incentivizing students without simultaneously incentivizing teachers did not produce learning gains.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:uwp:jhriss:v:60:y:2025:i:3:p:812-856
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25