The Durable Experiment: State Insurance of Workers' Compensation Risk in the Early Twentieth Century

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 1996
Volume: 56
Issue: 4
Pages: 809-836

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the early 1910s state governments debated the private versus public underwriting of workers' compensation risk. The choices they made established the existing system today and set the stage for later debates over the government's underwriting of unemployment, health, and disability risks. This article offers both quantitative and case-study analyses of states' original choices between public and private insurance. Monopoly state funds were adopted in some states because of an unusual combination of strong unions and weak insurance and agricultural interests. In other states, the emergence of progressive political coalitions played the decisive role.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:56:y:1996:i:04:p:809-836_01
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25