A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France

B-Tier
Journal: The Energy Journal
Year: 2005
Volume: 26
Issue: 1_suppl
Pages: 181-204

Authors (2)

Jean-Michel Glachant (not in RePEc) Dominique Finon (Centre International de Recher...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:sae:enejou:v:26:y:2005:i:1_suppl:p:181-204
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25